At what point should we define a software project as a catastrophe? What are the criteria for taking the drastic step of halting all activities, and how do we go about reassessing the project? And, most importantly, how do we go about getting the project moving again?
In Spencer Johnsons Who Moved My Cheese, the little people keep coming
back to where the cheese used to be even though its not there anymore. Its a natural
tendency to continue doing what we did before even when, to an outside
observer, it no longer makes sense. This behavior is quite common when software
projects get into trouble. We keep plodding away at the project hoping that the
problems will go away and the cheese will miraculously reappear. In all too
many cases, it doesnt.
Just as the smart thing to do when a ball of twine seems hopelessly entangled
is to stop whatever we are doing with it (otherwise, the tangle gets worse),
so it is with a disastrous project; the longer we keep at it, the worse it gets. At
some point, we need to halt all activity and reassess what we are doing.
Disastrous software projects, or catastrophes, are projects that are completely
out of control in one or more of the following aspects: schedule, budget, or
quality. They are by no means rare; 44% of surveyed development organizations
report that they have had software projects cancelled or abandoned due to significant
overruns, and 15% say that it has happened to more than 10% of their projects
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Percentage of surveyed organizations software projects that have
been abandoned or cancelled due to significant cost or time overruns
in the past three years (source )
But obviously, not every overrun or quality problem means a project is out
of control, so at what point should we define a software project as a catastrophe?
What are the criteria for taking the drastic step of halting all activities, and how
do we go about reassessing the project? Most importantly, how do we go about
getting the project moving again? The answers to these questions are the essence
of the concept of catastrophe disentanglement.
One of the best-known attempts to disentangle a multi-hundred-milliondollar
catastrophe ended recently, more than a decade after it began. In August
2005, the plug was finally pulled on the infamous Denver airport baggage handling
system, in a scene reminiscent of Hals demise in the memorable Kubrick
space odyssey movie.(1) This was a project that had gained notoriety for costing
one million dollars a day for being late. One of the interesting questions about the
Denver project is why didnt the repeated efforts to save it succeed?
Of all the problems that plagued the project (see , ), probably the most
formidable was the projects unachievable goals. It is unlikely that anyone associated
with the project could have brought about a significant change to the goals
because the projects extravagant functionality had, in fact, become part of its
main attraction. But the ability to define achievable goals is a cornerstone of any
catastrophe disentanglement process, without which the process cannot succeed,
and that is one of the main reasons the Denver system could not be disentangled.
As indicated by the above survey data, cases like the Denver project are not
rare (although few are as extreme). Most development organizations know this
even without seeing the survey data. This frustrating reality was expressed in a
famous quote from Martin Cobb of the Canadian Treasury Board: We know why
projects fail, we know how to prevent their failureso why do they still fail?.
Cobbs quote highlights the conventional approach of software engineering.
The objective of existing software engineering practices is to prevent the occurrence
of software catastrophesthat is, to prevent the project from spiraling out
of control. As such, the practices have an important role to play in software development.
However, more than five decades of experience show that despite these
methods, software catastrophes will continue to be around for a while.
When a software project is out of control, there is no PMI, IEEE, SEI, or ISO
rescue process to follow because these organizations offer preventive, rather than
corrective, solutions. But is such a project necessarily doomed? Will it inevitably
collapse in failure? The following chapters will show that this is far from
This article fills the void for corrective solutions in software engineering. It
deals with projects that are already in serious trouble. In fact, this article is less concerned
with how we got into trouble; it is more concerned with how we get out.
Overview of the Catastrophe Disentanglement Process
Before the first step in disentangling a project can be taken, we must first establish
that the whole process is necessary. This means deciding that the project, as
it is currently proceeding, has little chance of success without taking drastic
Many software organizations have difficulty making this decision, and some
avoid it entirely. In fact, there is a general tendency to let troubled projects carry
on way too long before appropriate action is taken . Keil  uses the term runaways
to describe software projects that continue to absorb valuable resources
without ever reaching their objective. Keils runaways are, in effect, undiagnosed
catastrophes that went on unchecked for much too long. Indeed, the ability to save
a project is usually dependent on how early in the schedule a catastrophe is diagnosed.
Furthermore, organizations that permit a runaway project to continue are
wasting valuable resources. This reality is well demonstrated in the following case.
A Case Study
The FINALIST case, described next, demonstrates how difficult it is to acknowledge
that a project is in serious trouble, even when the problem is obvious to
almost anyone looking in from the outside. It is an interesting case because it is
by no means unique; it demonstrates just how easy it is to become committed to
a failing path.
After the year 2000 passed, and the software prophets of doom faded
away, a Canadian software company found itself with almost no customers
for one of its small business units. The units main expertise was in supporting
Cobol programs (where many of the bug-2000 problems were expected
to be), and suddenly there wasnt enough Cobol work to support it.
So the company decided to rewrite one of its core products, FINALIST, a
large financial analysis system, but it chose to write it again in Cobol in
order to retain the companys unique expertise for solving bug-2000 problems
(which it still thought would materialize). The new project, appropriately
named FINALIST2, was given a 30-month schedule and a team of 14
developers, eight of whom were veteran Cobol programmers.
At the beginning of the second year of the project, two Cobol programmers
retired and, soon after, three more moved to another company. With only
three veteran Cobol programmers left, the FINALIST2 project began to
experience serious problems and schedule delays. The companys management
repeatedly resisted calls to reevaluate the project and attempted to get
it back on track by conducting frequent reviews, adding more people to the
team, providing incentives, and eventually, by extending the schedule.
Finally, 28 months into the project, a consultant was brought in, and his first
recommendation was to halt the project immediately. This drastic advice
was based on the conclusion that little or no meaningful progress was
being made and the project, as it was defined, would probably never be
completed. There were not enough experienced Cobol programmers
around to do the work, and it was unlikely that new ones would be hired.
Furthermore, it was unlikely that the new recruits would become sufficiently
proficient in Cobol within any reasonable time frame.
The final recommendation was to either restart the project in a modern programming
language or to cancel it entirely.
One of the key points in this case is that management failed to notice that what
was once a strength (Cobol) had ceased to be onea classic example of who
moved my cheese. This failure was clearly fostered by a strong desire to preserve
Cobol expertise within the company, but it was also the result of a natural reluctance
to acknowledge a mistake (resistance to reevaluate the project). These two
factors obscured the solution. And so management attempted to fix almost everything
(process, team, schedule) except the problem itself.
This case illustrates the difficulties decision makers have in accepting the
need for drastic measures and is reminiscent of a gambler who cannot get up and
walk away. First, there is the natural tendency to put off making the difficult decision
in hope that conventional methods will eventually get the project back on
track. A second difficulty involves over-commitment to previous decisions,
prompting the investment of more resources to avoid admitting mistakes (this is
known as escalation ).
But troubled projects are never a surprise, and even those most committed to
a failing path know that something is severely wrong. But how severe is severely
wrong? How can we know that it is time for drastic measures? Ideally, there
would be a decision algorithm (a kind of software breathalyzer) to which managers
could subject their projects, and which would make the decision for them.
Deciding to Rescue a Project
There is no perfect breathalyzer for catastrophes. However, although it is difficult
to make a completely objective decision about a project, there are methods that
remove much of the subjectivity from the decision. These methods involve an indepth
evaluation of the project and require significant effort. Unlike status reports
or regular progress reviews, they are not designed to be applied at regular intervals
throughout the development cycle. The process prescribed by these methods
is to be applied only when we suspect that a project may be in serious trouble, but
we are unsure whether it requires life-saving surgery.
The procedure is based on the evaluation of three basic project areas:
The procedure examines whether serious problems have existed for quite a while
in any of these project areas and whether the situation is getting worse, not better.
Any one of these areas can trigger a catastrophe decision, but when this happens,
it is not unusual for serious problems to exist in all three. The tricky
question is what quality really is (the definition will be based on the level of product
defects and the degree to which customers or users are satisfied with the product).
Once the decision has been made that a project is indeed a catastrophe, the
options become more clear: save it or lose it. This is the time for the ten-step disentanglement
The Disentanglement Process
The disentanglement process is designed to rescue a seriously troubled project,
provided it can establish business or strategic justification for doing so. The
process is built around two main figures: the initiating manager (who initiates the
process and oversees its implementation) and the project evaluator (who leads
and implements the disentanglement process). The initiating manager is an insider,
a senior manager in the organization that owns the project. The project evaluator
is an outsider, a seasoned professional, reliable, and impartial.
The catastrophe disentanglement process consists of the following ten steps:
- Stop: Halt all project development activities and assign the team to support
the disentanglement effort.
- Assign an evaluator: Recruit an external professional to lead the disentanglement
- Evaluate project status: Establish the true status of the project.
- Evaluate the team: Identify team problems that may have contributed to
the projects failure.
- Define minimum goals: Reduce the project to the smallest size that
achieves only the most essential goals.
- Determine whether minimum goals can be achieved: Analyze the feasibility
of the minimum goals and determine whether they can reasonably
be expected to be achieved.
- Rebuild the team: Based on the new project goals, rebuild a competent
project team in preparation for re-starting the project.
- Perform risk analysis: Consider the new goals and the rebuilt team, identify
risks in the project, and prepare contingency plans to deal with them.
- Revise the plan: Produce a new high-level project plan that includes a
reasonable schedule based on professionally prepared estimates.
- Install an early warning system: Put a system in place that will ensure
that the project does not slip back into catastrophe mode.
There are three main reports generated by the project evaluator during the disentanglement
- Step 4: The team overview document
The document contains a summary of the project team evaluation. It is
used as input to step 7 (rebuild the team). The overview includes the
main sources of information, the list of interviews, the reasoning that led
to any significant findings, and any problems or incompatibles that arose
during the evaluation.
- Step 6: The midway report
The document is generated midway through the disentanglement process
after establishing the feasibility of the minimized goals. This provides senior
management and other key stakeholders with a formal update on the
progress of the disentanglement process. The report documents all major
decisions, evaluations, and conclusions that produced the new reduced-scope
project. It also includes summaries of the discussion that led to
agreement among the key stakeholders.
- At the end of the disentanglement process: The final report
Producing this report is the project evaluators last task. The report summarizes
all information collected and generated, all decisions made, all
major project documents produced, and lists all problems that were
resolved or left unresolved. This report is produced even if the disentanglement
process does not succeed or if the project is cancelled.
The sequence of the disentanglement steps is organized according to the logical
flow described in Table 1. It is important to complete the steps in this sequence
(though parts of the steps may overlap). The following points demonstrate why
the sequence is important:
There will not be enough information to propose new goals until the project
has been evaluated (this includes both the project status and the team).
There will not be enough information to rebuild the team until the new
project goals have been established.
There will not be enough information for a new plan (schedule and estimates)
until the new project goals have been established, the team has
been rebuilt, and the risks have been identified.
Table 1 Logical Flow of the Ten Disentanglement Steps
is strongly dependent on the cooperation of all involved parties and the active
involvement of the project team. But the main precondition for success is the support
of the organizations senior management. As we shall see in the following
chapters, without effective management support, the process will fail at almost
The entire process should take no more than two weeks to complete This also represents the maximum amount of time that the
project will remain halted.(2)
A Closer Look at the Data
We have seen in Figure 1 that software catastrophes are not rare, but the data in
Figure 1 does not tell the whole story. Could these projects have been saved if
a formal disentanglement process (like the one we described earlier) had been
used in time? An indication can be found by looking at additional data related to
the schedule, budget, and quality of the projects (these are the factors that would
have triggered the process).
The data in Table 2 is based on a broad software development survey 
that defined a schedule overrun of more than 50% as severe, a budget overrun of
more than 50% as severe, and the quality problems of a product with critical post-release
defects as being severe. These projects are considered failures even though
they were permitted to run their course to completion (and many would submit
that they should not have been permitted to do so).(3)
- Schedule: The data clearly shows that severe schedule overruns are far
from rare. In a quarter of the surveyed software organizations, more than
10% of the projects had severe schedule overruns. In 13% of these organizations,
the situation was much worse: more than a quarter of their projects
had severe schedule overruns.
- Budgets: The data for software project budgets is just a shade better. In
just less than a quarter of software organizations, more than 10% of the
projects were severely over budget. In 8% of these organizations, more
than a quarter of the projects were severely over budget.
- Quality: The data for quality does not tell a good story. More than a third
of software organizations (35%) had severe quality problems in more than
10% of their products after their release. Of these, 15% reported severe
quality problems in more than a quarter of their products after their
Table 2 The Proportion in Software Development Organizations of Software Projects with
Severe Problems (Source: The Cutter Consortium, 2005)
After a severely troubled project is completed or cancelled, there is, of course, no
way of telling whether the outcome could have been different. However, we speculate
that many of these severely troubled projects could have been rescued. At
the very least, such projects would have greatly benefited from an early warning
system. The survey findings are from projects that were more than 50% overschedule
or over budget or had critically severe quality problems. The warning
system is designed to trigger an alarm whenever such conditions begin
Interestingly, the survey found that 50% of software development organizations
do implement some type of project rescue process. These companies reported
that they handle early indications of project failure by initiating a formal project
reevaluation process resulting in possible changes to goals, plans, and the development
team. These are precisely the elements of the catastrophe disentanglement
process presented in this book. Furthermore, according to another survey finding
shown in Figure 2, 45% of organizations almost always succeed in getting troubled
projects back on track. We can speculate that they overlap the 50% that conduct
rescue processes.(4) These, then, are organizations that have independently
developed catastrophe disentanglement processes, and have apparently applied
them to great effect.
Figure 2: How frequently are troubled projects saved?
The survey also looked at the cost of catastrophes. When asked to assess the
impact of software project failures on their organization, the most common
response lamented the waste of funds, time, and other resources. Others reported a
decline in the organizations motivation and prestige and the loss of customers and
business opportunities. Clearly, the high cost of project catastrophes goes way
beyond the cost of the failed project itself. With an effective disentanglement
process, it is practically certain that much of these costs could have been avoided.
Tips Before You Proceed
There is no magic or mystery in the ten steps of the catastrophe disentanglement
process. They are all familiar steps that many software developers will have used
at various times in their careers. The strength of the process is in combining the
steps together, implementing them as a single aggregate with each step building
on the previous ones, and doing so within a short, fixed schedule.
Before proceeding with the implementation of the process, here is a summary
of several of the tips that are provided throughout the discussion of the ten
- Work in parallel.
Though the ten steps of the process need to be completed in sequence,
they do not need to start in sequence. In fact, parts of some of the steps
can be implemented in parallel to others (this can save time). For example,
step 8 (risk analysis) can begin as soon as step 3 (evaluate project
status) is complete, and much of steps 5 and 6 (define and evaluate the feasibility
of minimum goals) can be implemented in parallel.
- Expect resistance.
Expect resistance to change; it is natural. The best way to deal with resistance
is by enlisting the support of allies from among the project stakeholders
and the project team. In cases where resistance is particularly high,
enlist the support of senior management.
- Be sensitive to the team and to the stakeholders.
Be sensitive to the emotional concerns of the project team and stakeholders.
Team members will have legitimate job security and career concerns.
Some of the stakeholders will have personal interests in the project that will
not necessarily be financial or business related. Before proceeding, become
familiar with the key stakeholders and team members.
- Keep within the schedule.
The process can easily slip well beyond the allocated two weeks; this will
happen one day at a time, and at some point the delay is no longer manageable.
Treat any delay (even of a half day) as a problem that needs to be
Overcome delays by working whenever possible at a high level (leaving
details to be filled in by the team after the project resumes), by using a
project evaluation team, and implementing the disentanglement steps in
parallel. If delays are caused by a lack of cooperation, enlist the immediate
help of the organizations senior management.
- Do not proceed without senior management support.
The disentanglement process cannot succeed without firm visible support
from senior management. The process requires significant cooperation
from all involved parties, and this will not be assured without such senior
The process also involves activities that will generate resistance from the
project stakeholders and the development team. In some cases, it will be
difficult or even impossible to overcome the resistance without the support
of senior management.
- Encourage all involved parties to review the disentanglement process.
The disentanglement process is more likely to succeed if all involved parties
understand how it works and why each step is being implemented.
Thus, while the description in the following chapters is directed toward
the project evaluator and the initiating manager, all parties involved in the
effort to rescue the project will benefit by understanding the process.
- Document decisions and findings.
All key decisions and all major findings should be documented. This will
save time, should the decisions need to be reevaluated or explained. The
decisions and findings document should be maintained by the project evaluator
and submitted to the initiating manager at the end of the process.
- Be open and accessible.
Many of the concerns and much of the reluctance to cooperate can be
overcome by conducting the disentanglement in an open and candid manner.
This means no clandestine decisions and no behind-closed-doors
meetings except in rare occasions when topics of a purely personal nature
are discussed (they should be kept to a minimum).
- Listen to arguments.
Be prepared to listen to arguments before decisions are finalized, provided
they are of a professional nature (exclude political and personal interest
viewpoints). After decisions have been made, be prepared to re-open
them only if significant new information becomes available that was not
previously considered. Be resolute about preventing undue delays in finalizing
discussions and decisions.
- Not all problems discussed will occur.
The following chapters provide guidelines for resolving many problems
that may arise during the disentanglement process. This can be alarming.
Remember, not all problems will actually occurin fact, most will not.
The guidelines are like a first aid kit; just because you carry anti-venom
serum doesnt mean that you will be bitten by a snake.
- The key to success is a good evaluator.
Of all the factors that affect the disentanglement process, the two that most
contribute to its success are senior management support (discussed earlier)
and a good project evaluator. Start the search for evaluator candidates
even before a final decision has been made to proceed with the disentanglement
- Read through the entire process.
Read through the entire process before proceeding. Many of the steps are
inter-dependent. You can better implement each step if you understand the
steps that follow.
One final point: There are no shortcuts. The disentanglement process is designed
to be implemented in its entirety. Each step relates to the evaluation or resolution
of a problem that, if left unsolved, is likely to disrupt the entire disentanglement
process. Furthermore, several of the steps are inter-dependent. In fact, the final
step (install an early warning system), which ensures that the project does not slip
back into catastrophe mode, is dependent on the preceding nine steps.
Disastrous software projects, or catastrophes, are projects that are completely out
of control in one or more of the following aspects: schedule, budget, or quality.
But obviously, not every overrun or quality problem means a project is out of control,
so at what point should we define a software project as a catastrophe? What
are the criteria for taking the drastic step of halting all activities, and how do we
go about reassessing the project? And, most importantly, how do we go about getting
the project moving again? The answers to these questions are the essence of
the concept of catastrophe disentanglement.
Before the first step in the disentanglement process can be taken, we must
first establish that the whole process is, indeed, necessary. This means deciding
that the project, as it is currently proceeding, has little chance of success without
taking drastic measures.
There are methods that can help remove much of the subjectivity from this
decision. The idea is not to define an algorithm and subject projects to it every
week, but rather to provide a procedure to be applied only when we suspect that
a project may be in serious trouble and we are unsure if it requires drastic lifesaving
The procedure is based on the evaluation of three basic project areas: schedule,
budget, and quality. The procedure examines whether serious problems have
existed for quite a while in any of these project areas and whether the situation is
getting worse, not better.
The disentanglement process is built around two main figures: the initiating
manager, who initiates the process and overseas it as it is being implemented, and
the project evaluator, who leads and implements the disentanglement process.
The ten steps of the catastrophe disentanglement process are
- Assign an evaluator.
- Evaluate project status.
- Evaluate the team.
- Define minimum goals.
- Determine whether minimum goals can be achieved.
- Rebuild the team.
- Perform risk analysis.
- Revise the plan.
- Install an early warning system.
The ten steps should be completed in sequence, and the entire process should take
no more than two weeks to complete.
The following list summarizes several tips for the successful implementation
of the disentanglement process:
- Work on the steps in parallel.
- Expect resistance from stakeholders and project team members.
- Be sensitive to the team and to the stakeholders. Before proceeding,
become familiar with the key stakeholders and team members.
- Keep within the two-week disentanglement process schedule.
- Do not proceed without senior management support. The process cannot
succeed without it.
- Encourage all involved parties to review the disentanglement process. The
process is more likely to succeed if all involved parties understand how it
- All key decisions and all major findings should be documented.
- Be open and accessible. This will reduce concerns and any reluctance to
- Be prepared to listen to arguments before decisions are finalized.
- Remember that not all problems discussed here will actually occurin
fact, most will not.
- The key to success is a good evaluator. Start the search early.
- Read through the entire process before proceeding. Many of the steps are
There are no shortcuts in the disentanglement process. The process is designed to
be implemented in its entirety. Each step relates to the evaluation or resolution of
a problem that, if left unsolved, is likely to disrupt the entire disentanglement
(1) Hal was the wayward computer in Stanley Kubricks movie 2001: A Space Odyssey.
(2) Unless, of course, the project cannot be saved and gets cancelled.
(3) The most common argument is that organizations that permit overruns of more than 50%, or the
release of products with severe quality problems, have little chance of survival.
(4) Without the need to speculate further, we can state that the 45% is a low figure; there are
certainly more successful project rescues within the 30% who responded that some are saved
and some are not. So the overlap may look even better.
About the Author
s extensive hands-on management experience stems from many years as senior director at Motorola Inc., developing large software systems and leading multinational design centers. He has also been vice president of engineering at Midway Corporation, where he managed several hundred software and hardware engineers. A frequent lecturer and speaker on software project management, he is author of On Time Within Budget: Software Project Management, Practices and Techniques, Third Edition (Wiley, 2000). Mr. Bennatan is currently president of Advanced Project Solutions, Inc. (www.AdvancedPS.com) and senior consultant for the Boston Cutter Consortium.
About the Book
Catastrophe Disentanglement: Getting Software Projects Back on Track
By E. M. Bennatan
Published: April 11, 2006, Paperback: 288 pages
Published by Addison Wesley Professional
Retail price: $39.99
This material is from Chapter 1 of the book.